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Many industries are geographically concentrated. Many mechanisms that could account
for such agglomeration have been proposed. We note that these theories make diﬀerent
predictions about which pairs of industries should be coagglomerated. We discuss the
measurement of coagglomeration and use data from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal
Research Database from 1972 to 1997 to compute pairwise coagglomeration measurements
for U.S. manufacturing industries. Industry attributes are used to construct measures
of the relevance of each of Marshall’s three theories of industry agglomeration to each
industry pair: (1) agglomeration saves transport costs by proximity to input suppliers or
ﬁnal consumers, (2) agglomeration allows for labor market pooling, and (3) agglomeration
facilitates intellectual spillovers. We assess the importance of the theories via regressions
of coagglomeration indices on these measures. Data on characteristics of corresponding
industries in the United Kingdom are used as instruments. We ﬁnd evidence to support each
mechanism. Our results suggest that input-output dependencies are the most important
factor, followed by labor pooling.1 Introduction
We know that industries are geographically concentrated.1 We know that this concentration
is too great to be explained by exogenous spatial diﬀerences in natural advantage.2 We have
an abundance of theories for this concentration.3 But we do not which of these theories
are important or even right. This paper uses patterns of coagglomeration–the tendency
of diﬀerent industries to locate near to each other–to assess the importance of diﬀerent
theories of geographic concentration.
Marshall (1920) emphasized three diﬀerent types of transport costs–the costs of moving
goods, people, and ideas–that could be reduced by industrial agglomeration. First, he
considered transport costs for goods and argued that ﬁrms will locate near suppliers or
customers to save shipping costs. Second, he developed a theory of labor market pooling
in which ﬁrms located near one another can share labor. The larger labor pool created
by agglomeration allows workers to move to more productive ﬁrms when there are shocks.
Third, he began the theory of intellectual spillovers by arguing that in agglomerations, “the
mysteries of the trade become no mystery, but are, as it were, in the air.” Firms, such as
those described by AnnaLee Saxenian (1994) in Silicon Valley, locate near one another to
learn and to speed their rate of innovation.
Although each of these determinants certainly contributes to agglomeration in some
industries, assessing their aggregate relative importance is challenging because they all
predict that ﬁrms will co-locate with other ﬁrms in the same industry. One approach
pioneered by David B. Audretsch and Maryann P. Feldman (1996) and Stuart S. Rosenthal
and William C. Strange (2001) is to examine cross-industry variation in the degree of
agglomeration, e.g. regressing the degree to which an industry is agglomerated on the
importance of R&D to the industry. In this paper we propose an alternate approach: we
study the agglomeration process through the lens of how industries are coagglomerated.
This can potentially exploit the fact that the theories make diﬀerent predictions about
1See P. Sargant Florence (1948), E. M. Hoover (1948), Victor Fuchs (1990), Paul Krugman (1991a), and
Glenn Ellison and Edward L. Glaeser (1997).
2See Ellison and Glaeser (1999).
3See Johann Heinrich von Th¨ unen (1826), Alfred Marshall (1920), and Krugman (1991b).
1which pairs of industries will tend to coagglomerate.4 For example, if transport costs for
goods are important, then ﬁrms in an industry should be agglomerated near industries
that are their customers or suppliers. If labor market pooling is important, then industries
should locate near other industries that employ the same type of labor. Our approach, like
those of the other papers mentioned above, uses industry characteristics as covariates. One
could worry that these are endogenous and reﬂect the industry’s geography. Our second
main empirical innovation is to use characteristics of U.K. industries as instruments for the
characteristics of their U.S. counterparts.
We begin in Section II with some material on the measurement of coagglomeration. We
review the index of coagglomeration proposed in Ellison and Glaeser (1997), note that a
simpler equivalent deﬁnition can be used when measuring pairwise coagglomeration, and
further develop the economic motivation for the index as a measure of the importance of
cross-industry spillovers and shared natural advantage.
Section III describes the data used to generate our coagglomeration index and presents
some basic descriptive results. We base our coagglomeration measures on establishment-
level data from the Census of Manufactures. This data set allows us to calculate co-
agglomeration for every pairwise combination of three-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion (SIC) industries at the state, metropolitan area, and county levels.
Section IV reviews Marshall’s three theories and discusses the covariates we will use to
assess the importance of diﬀerent reasons for co-location. We use input-output tables to
construct proxies for the importance of transport costs for goods. We use the correlation
across industries in their employment of diﬀerent occupations to measure the potential gains
from labor market pooling. Finally, we use data on technology ﬂows and patent citations
to construct proxies for the importance of technological spillovers. Our empirical approach
is to regress the extent to which each pair of industries is co-located on the extent to which
these two industries buy and sell from each other, hire the same type of workers, and share
ideas. One potential concern with this approach is that the measures may not be innate
characteristics of industries: ﬁrms may buy and sell from one another because they are
4See J. Vernon Henderson (2003) for a related approach: Henderson examines how plant-level produc-
tivity is related to the set of plants in the area.
2close, not be close because they buy and sell from each other. To address this, we use
British input-output tables, employment patterns, and patent citations to instrument for
our American measures.
Section V presents our main empirical results. The ordinary least squares relationships
support the importance of all three theories. Input/output relationships appear to be the
most important determinants of co-location. Given the remarkable decline of transportation
costs over the 20th century (Glaeser and Janet E. Kohlhase, 2004), it is striking that
transport costs remain so important. Industries that hire the same type of workers are
also quite likely to locate near one another. This eﬀect is almost as strong as the role
of supplier/customer relationship. Our proxies for intellectual spillovers have a slightly
weaker, but still quite signiﬁcant, impact on the tendency of industries to coagglomerate.
Our instrumental variables strategy delivers similar results.
Section VI concludes. Industrial co-location patterns are far from random. Firms
unsurprisingly locate near their customers and suppliers. They are almost as driven by the
advantages of sharing a large labor pool, and intellectual spillovers also matter.
2 Measurement of Coagglomeration
In this section we discuss an index of coagglomeration introduced in Ellison and Glaeser
(1997). We note that the index takes on a simpler form when used to measure pairwise
coagglomeration and we further develop the economic motivation for the index as a measure
of the importance of cross-industry spillovers and shared natural advantages.
2.1 Background
Consider a group of industries indexed by i = 1,2,...,I. Suppose that a geographic whole
is divided into M subareas and suppose that s1i,s2i,...,sMi are the shares of industry i’s
employment contained in each of these areas. Let x1,x2,...,xM be some other measure of
the size of these areas, such as each area’s share of population or aggregate employment.





3Ellison and Glaeser (1997) note that it is problematic to make cross-industry or cross-
country comparisons using this measure because it will be aﬀected by the size distribution
of plants in the industry and the ﬁneness of the available geographic data. They propose








where Hi is the plant-level Herﬁndahl index of industry i.5 They show that the EG index
“controls” for diﬀerences in the plant size distribution and the ﬁneness of the geographic
breakdown, in the sense of being an unbiased estimator of a parameter reﬂecting the im-
portance of natural advantages and spillovers in a simple model of location choice.
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) also propose a measure of the coagglomeration of a group
of I industries. Let wi be industry i’s share of total employment in the I industries. Let
s1,...,sM be the shares of the total employment in the group of I industries in each of
the geographic subareas. (Note that sm =
PI
i=1 wismi.) Write G for the raw geographic
concentration for the I-industry group: G =
PM
m=1(sm −xm)2. Write H for the plant-level
Herﬁndahl of the I-industry group: H =
P
i w2














The index reﬂects excess concentration of the I-industry group relative to what would be
expected if each industry were as agglomerated as it is, but the locations of the agglom-
erations were independent. The particular form is motivated by a proposition relating the
expected value of the index to properties of the location-choice model.
Proposition 0 Ellison and Glaeser (1997)
In an I-industry probabilistic location choice model, suppose that the indicator variables
{ukm} for whether the kth plant locates in area m satisfy E(ukm) = xm and
Corr(ukm,u`m) =
(
γi if plants k and ` both belong to industry i
γ0 if plants k and ` belong to diﬀerent industries.
Then, E(γc) = γ0.




ki, where k = 1,2,...,Ni indexes the plants in industry i and zki is the
employment of plant k as a share of the total employment in industry i.
42.2 A simpler formula
The EG coagglomeration index is a measure of the average coagglomeration of industries
in a group. A simpler equivalent formula can be given for the coagglomeration of two
industries.
Proposition 1 An equivalent formula for the EG coagglomeration index when I = 2 is
γc =
PM






The formula makes clear that the EG coagglomeration index is closely related to the
covariance of the state-industry employment shares in the two industries. The denominator
rescales the simple covariance to eliminate a sensitivity to the ﬁneness of the geographic
breakdown. Note that plant-level Herﬁndahls do not enter into the formula: the lumpi-
ness of plants causes an increase in the variance of the state-industry employment shares
that could be mistaken for within-industry agglomeration, but does not by itself lead to a
spurious increase in the cross-industry covariance. (Larger plant Herﬁndahls will, however,
make γc a noisier parameter estimate.)
2.3 Explicit models of location choice
Proposition 0 is in a sense quite general: it shows that the coagglomeration index is ap-
propriate if location decisions are made in any manner that satisﬁes one property. This
generality, however, is obtained at the expense of losing explicit connections to the eco-
nomics of location decisions and how they are inﬂuenced by natural advantages, spillovers,
etc. In this section we extend the single-industry model of Ellison and Glaeser (1997) to
make these connections.
We will discuss spillovers and natural advantages separately using two models with
many elements in common. There are two industries indexed by i = 1,2, with N1 plants in
industry 1 and N2 plants in industry 2. Plants are indexed by k ∈ K1 ∪K2, with K1 being
the set of plants in industry 1 and K2 being the set of plants in industry 2. The plants
choose among M possible locations. Each plant has an exogenously ﬁxed employment level
ek that is independent of its location choice.
52.3.1 Spillovers
We conceptualize spillovers as mechanisms that make plant k’s proﬁts a function of the
other plants’ location decisions. A general model of this form would be to assume that
ﬁrm k’s proﬁts when locating in area m are of the form πkm = f(m,`−k,km), where `−k
is the vector of all plants’ location decisions and km is a random shock. A diﬃculty with
discussing the degree of geographic concentration in such a model is that the location choice
process becomes a game that can have multiple equilibria. For example, if plants k and
k0 receive substantial beneﬁts from co-locating, then there may be equilibria in which the
two plants co-locate in any of several areas that are fairly good for each plant, and also an
equilibrium in which the plants forego the spillover beneﬁts and locate in the areas that are
most advantageous for each plant separately. (This will only be an equilibrium if plant k’s
most-preferred location is suﬃciently unattractive to plant k0 and vice-versa.) The diﬀerent
equilibria will typically lead to diﬀerent levels of measured concentration.
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) note that the impact of equilibrium multiplicity is substan-
tially reduced if one considers random “all-or-nothing” spillovers. To extend their analysis,
deﬁne a partition ω of K1 ∪ K2 to be a correspondence ω : K1 ∪ K2
→
→ K1 ∪ K2 such that
k ∈ ω(k) for all k and k0 ∈ ω(k) ⇒ ω(k) = ω(k0). Suppose that plants’ location decisions
are the outcome of game in which the plants choose locations in some (possibly random)
exogenously speciﬁed order and plant k’s proﬁts from locating in area m are given by
log(πkm) = log(xm) +
X
k0∈ω(k)
I(`k0 6= m)(−∞) + km.
The ﬁrst term on the right-side of this expression, xm, is the measure of the size of area
m we used when constructing the concentration index. Its inclusion allows the model to
match real-world data in which many more plants locate in California than in Wyoming.6
The second term reﬂects the impact of spillovers: the interpretation is that a spillover exists
between plants k and k0 if k0 ∈ ω(k) and that when spillovers exist they are suﬃciently
strong so as to outweigh all other factors in the location decision process. The third term in
6Ellison and Glaeser (1997) note that their model has an equivalent formulation in which each potential
“location” is equally proﬁtable on average and the reason why there are many more plants in California is
that California is an aggregate of a larger number of “locations”.
6the proﬁt function, km, is a Weibull distributed random shock that is independent across
plants and locations.
Proposition 2 Consider the model of location choices with spillovers described above:
(a) The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome is essentially unique. In equilibrium,
each plant k chooses the location m that maximizes log(xm)+km if no plant with k0 ∈ ω(k)
has previously chosen a location, and the location of previously located plants with k0 ∈ ω(k)
if some such plants have previously chosen a location.
(b) If 0 ≤ γs
0 ≤ γs
1,γs
2 or 0 ≤ γs
1,γs
2 and 0 ≤ γ0 ≤ min(1/N1,1/N2), then there exist
distributions over the set of possible partitions for which
Prob{k0 ∈ ω(k)} =
(
γs
i if plants k and k0 both belong to industry i
γs
0 if plants k and k0 belong to diﬀerent industries,
(c) If the distribution satisﬁes the condition in part (b), then in any PBE of the model






1. Note that Proposition 2 shows a degree of robustness to equilibrium selection: it shows
that the agglomeration index has the same expected value in any PBE of the sequential
move games obtained by ordering the plants in diﬀerent ways.
2. Proposition 2 also shows some robustness to the distribution of spillover beneﬁts. Our
agglomeration and coagglomeration indexes have the same expected value for any distri-
bution over partitions satisfying the condition in part (b). The proof of the proposition
describes a couple diﬀerent ways to generate distributions satisfying the condition. One is
very simple technically and has a four point support. Another generates coagglomeration
patterns that look more reasonable by ﬁrst creating clusters within each industry and then
joining clusters across industries.
72.3.2 Shared natural advantage
Another mechanism that can lead to the coagglomeration of plants in two industries is
the presence in some areas of “shared natural advantages” that provide beneﬁts to ﬁrms
in both industries. The natural advantages can be exogenous factors, as when a coastal
location makes a state attractive both to shipbuilding plants and to oil reﬁneries. They can
also be endogenous factor advantages of the types described in each of Marshall’s theories,
e.g. airplane manufacturers and automobile parts manufacturers may be coagglomerated
because both beneﬁt from locating in areas with skilled machinists.
To model natural-advantage inﬂuenced location choice, we suppose that proﬁts for a
plant k that belongs to industry i(k) and locates in area m are given by
(2) log(πmk) = log(ηm + ξmi(k)) + mk,
where the ηm, ξmi, and mk are mutually independent random variables. The ηm can be
thought of as reﬂecting shared natural advantages of each area m that make it attractive
or unattractive to plants in both industries.7 The ξmi reﬂect additional factors that are
idiosyncratic to industry i. As in the previous model, we also assume that there are plant-
idiosyncratic factors, mk.
Proposition 3 Suppose that proﬁts are as in equation (2) and that each plant k chooses
the location m that maximizes πmk.
(a) Suppose 0 < γna
1 ≤ γna






1 . Write δmi for ηm + ξmi.

















0 xm(1 − xm).
7These could include state policies as discussed in Thomas Holmes (1998).
8(b) If the distributions of the ηm and the ξmi are such that the conditions in part (a)
are satisﬁed and the mk are independent Weibull random variables, then the agglomeration






1. As is described in more detail in the proof of Proposition 3, one speciﬁcation of the
shared- and industry-idiosyncratic natural advantages that can be made to satisfy the
conditions in part (a) involves choosing the ηm and ξmi to be χ2 random variables with
appropriately chosen degrees of freedom. In this speciﬁcation the δmi are χ2 random vari-
ables with 2xm(1 − γna
i )/γna
i degrees of freedom. The lowest level of coagglomeration,
E(γc) = 0, obtains when there are no shared natural advantages: if we assume that the ηm
are identically zero, then the δmi are independent across industries and state-industry em-






1 , obtains when we make the shared natural advantages as important as
possible: if the ξm2 are identically zero, then all of the natural advantages aﬀecting industry
2 are shared natural advantages.8
2. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) also provide a result characterizing the expected value of the
agglomeration index when both spillovers and natural advantages are present. This result
does not have a clean generalization to the multi-industry case. The diﬃculty is that both
agglomeration and coagglomeration are no longer independent of the equilibrium selection.
For example, if a spillover exists between plants in separate industries, there will be more
agglomeration in each industry if the plant from the more agglomerated industry chooses
the joint location than if the plant from the less agglomerated industry does so.
3 Data on Coagglomeration
In this section we present some descriptive statistics on coagglomeration patterns.
8In this case, the ηm are distributed χ
















) degrees of freedom.
9We compute pairwise coagglomation measures for manufacturing industries using the
conﬁdential plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures.9 We
examine the censuses from 1972 to 1997, each of which contains data on approximately
300,000 establishments employing about 17 million workers. We aggregate the plant-level
employment data in the census up to the county-level, PMSA-level, and the state-level and
compute coagglomeration metrics all three ways.10 At the industry level we focus on the
three-digit level of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC3). The sample analyzed
in this section includes 134 industries, consisting of all SIC3 manufacturing industries except
Tobacco (210s), Fur (237), and Search and Navigation Equipment (381).11
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of several measures of agglomeration and coag-
glomeration.12 The table is divided into three panels. The top panel presents indices
calculated from state-level employment data. The ﬁrst row shows that the EG industrial
agglomeration index remains fairly stable between 1972 and 1982, and then falls by about
10% in the following decade. The next two rows summarize trends in the pairwise coagglom-
eration index. The mean pairwise coagglomeration is approximately zero. This is largely by
deﬁnition: our benchmark measure of a state’s “size” is its share of manufacturing employ-
ment so each industry’s deviations from the benchmark will be approximately uncorrelated
with the average of the deviations of all other industries. The standard deviation of the
coagglomeration index is more interesting, showing a decline (tighter distribution) from
1972 to 1997.
The second panel presents corresponding ﬁgures computed using PMSA-level employ-
ments. The average decline in agglomeration from 1982 to 1992 is smaller at this geographic
level and agglomeration appears to have increased from 1992 to 1997. The coagglomera-
tion distribution again shows a declining standard deviation. At the industry-pair level,
9Timothy Dunne, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson (1989a, 1989b), Robert McGuckin and Suzanne
Peck (1992), Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh (1996), and David Autor, William Kerr, and
Adriana Kugler (forthcoming) provide detailed accounts of this dataset.
10We use reported employment in all manufacturing establishments excluding auxiliary units as our mea-
sure x of aggregate activity in the geographic unit.
11These six industries are omitted due to major industry reclassiﬁcations at the plant-level in the Census
of Manufacturers that are diﬃcult to interpret.
12Additional details on the dataset construction are catalogued in the data appendix. A portion of these
coagglomeration estimates have been released for public use by the Census Bureau and are available from
the authors upon request.
10the coagglomeration indices computed using the PMSA-level data have an 0.59 correlation
with indices computed from state-level data.
A nice feature of the Census of Manufactures is that one can track plants over time and
separate new plants from old plants. The third panel provides statistics on agglomeration
and coagglomeration indices for the new “startups” in each industry.13 The agglomeration
and coagglomeration of these startups could be diﬀerent from the overall pattern because
they are less tied to past industrial centers than existing plants or the new establishments
of existing ﬁrms (see Guy Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser 2002) and their location choices
come after the inter-industry dependencies described below are formed. These measures
are naturally more noisy than those calculated through total employment due to smaller
number of plants involved and the distinct sets of plants being considered in each census
year. The agglomeration data show an initial decline and a later increase, particularly in the
ﬁnal census year. This pattern is reﬂected in the standard deviation of the coagglomeration
index too. At the industry-pair level, the correlation between coagglomeration measures
computed at the state level using all ﬁrms and those computed using new startups is 0.33.
Dumais et al. (2002) noted that the EG agglomeration index for an industry is highly
correlated over time (even relative to the magnitude of state-industry employment changes).
Table 2 indicates that coagglomeration indices are also highly correlated over time. For
example, the number in the upper left cell indicates that the correlation between the 1972
and 1977 coagglomeration indices for an industry-pair is 0.953. The correlations are at least
0.936 for each ﬁve-year period. The correlation between 1972 and 1997 coagglomeration
indices is still about 0.740.
Table 3 contains a list of the ﬁfteen most coagglomerated industry pairs. Most involve
textile and apparel industries, which are heavily concentrated in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia. None of these coagglomerations are as strong as the within-industry
agglomerations of the most agglomerated industries. For example, Ellison and Glaeser
13More precisely, we ﬁrst compute the total employment in each state-industry attributable to plants that
did not appear in the previous census and did not belong to a ﬁrm that existed in the previous census (in
this or any other industry). We then compute the agglomeration and coagglomeration indices using these
totals as the state-industry employments. Approximately 80% of new manufacturing plants are startups
in this sense. These startups enter at smaller sizes and account for about 50% of entering establishment
employment. See Kerr and Ramana Nanda (2006) for more detail regarding the diﬀerences in entry sizes
and entry rates between ﬁrm births and the expansion establishments of existing ﬁrms.
11(1997) ﬁnd that γ = 0.63 for the fur industry (SIC 237). Many, many industry-pairs
have approximately zero coagglomeration. Negative values of the index arise when pairs of
industries are agglomerated in diﬀerent areas. The lowest value of -0.065 obtains for the
coagglomeration of the Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles (376) and Railroad Equipment
(374) industries. We imagine that most strong negative coagglomerations like this are
mostly due to coincidence.
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the mean 1987 coagglomeration between SIC3 pairs
within SIC2 pairwise bins. The matrix conﬁrms that SIC3 pairs within the same SIC2
category are generally positively coagglomerated. Apart from the high coagglomeration
of the subindustries of the textile industry (SIC 22), none of the means are very large.
This further illustrates that there is a great deal of idiosyncratic variation in coagglom-
eration levels across industry pairs. The remainder of this paper attempts to exploit this
variation to provide insight into the relative importance of diﬀerent theories of geographic
concentration.
4 Why Do Firms Agglomerate? Empirical Methodology
The gains from concentration, whether in cities or geographic clusters, always ultimately
come from reducing some form of transport costs. Marshall emphasized that these transport
costs could be for goods, people, or ideas. Firms locate near suppliers or customers to reduce
the costs of buying or selling goods. Firms concentrate to reap the advantages from a large
pool of potential employees. Firms locate near one another to reduce the costs of accessing
new ideas and innovations. Our primary goal is to assess which of these are relatively more
important.
Interesting papers by Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2001)
have addressed this question by examining cross-industry variation in the degree to which
industries are agglomerated. The idea of these papers is that even though all three of
Marshall’s theories predict that industries will agglomerate, one might be able to tell them
apart by looking at which industries are more and less agglomerated. Audretsch and Feld-
man examine whether industries that are more R&D intensive are more agglomerated, and
Rosenthal and Strange add proxies for Marshall’s other factors as well, e.g. looking at
12whether agglomeration is greater in industries with highly educated workers and in which
material input costs are large relative to value-added.
The motivation for our empirical approach is that there may be a great deal of ad-
ditional information in coagglomeration patterns. For example, we can examine not just
whether input-intensive industries are agglomerated, but whether they are located near
the industries that produce their inputs. There is additional information about location
patterns to explore because industries that are agglomerated will be coagglomerated with
some industries but not with others. There is also additional potentially useful variance in
the explanatory variables at the industry-pair level: each industry has supplier/customer
relationships with some industries and not with others; each industry has labor needs that
are similar to those of some other industries and unlike those of others; and each industry
is more likely to beneﬁt from ideas generated by some industries than others.
The empirical strategy in this paper is to look at whether industries locate near other
industries that are their suppliers or customers, near other industries that use similar labor,
or near other industries that might share ideas. We do this via regressions with pairwise
coagglomeration as the dependent variable and proxies for the importance of Marshall’s
agglomerative forces as the independent variables. Our goal is to learn not just about co-
agglomeration, but to learn more generally about the relative importance of goods, people,
and ideas in the location decisions of manufacturing ﬁrms.
In the following subsections, we brieﬂy discuss the three agglomeration forces and our
approach to measuring them. Our empirical speciﬁcation will look at the extent to which
every pair of industries co-locates, so our empirical strategy requires us to construct po-
tential explanatory variables reﬂecting the extent to which each pair of industries connects
in goods, people, and ideas. We will do this in a single cross-section: we regress the 1987
values of the coagglomeration index on measures of industry-pair connections constructed
using data from as close to 1987 as possible.14
14We did not feel that it was worthwhile to try to do this analysis in a panel setting for several reasons: we
know that industry-pair coagglomeration is very highly correlated over time; we think that the industry-pair
connections also do not change greatly over time; and data limitations would prevent us from calculating
several of our measures at higher frequency.
134.1 Proximity to customers and suppliers: Goods
The most straightforward reason for ﬁrms to locate near one another is to reduce the costs of
getting inputs or shipping goods to downstream customers. When inputs are far away from
the eventual market, Marshall (1920) argued that ﬁrms will trade oﬀ the distance between
customers and suppliers based on the costs of moving raw inputs and ﬁnished goods. The
“new economic geography” of Masahisa Fujita, Krugman, and Anthony Venables (1999)
views reducing the costs of transporting goods as the driver behind agglomeration. To
assess the importance of this factor, we must assess the extent to which diﬀerent industries
buy and sell from one another. We use the 1987 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis to measure the extent that industries buy and sell from one
another. The input-output tables provide commodity-level ﬂows which we aggregate up to
the three-digit SIC level. We deﬁne Inputi←j as the share of industry i’s inputs that come
from industry j. We also deﬁne Outputi→j as the share of industry i’s outputs that are sold
to industry j. These shares are calculated relative to all suppliers and customers, some of
whom may be non-manufacturing industries or ﬁnal consumers.
Inputi←j and Outputi→j are share variables that could go from zero to one. In fact,
the highest observed value of Inputi←j is 0.39, which represents the share of inputs that
come to Leather Tanning and Finishing (SIC 311) from Meat Products (SIC 201). The
highest relative value of Outputi→j is 0.82, which represents the importance of output
sales from Public Building and Related Furniture (SIC 253) to Motor Vehicles and Equip-
ment (SIC 371).15 For most industry pairs, of course, Inputi←j and Outputi→j are ap-
proximately zero.16 To construct a single proxy for the connection in goods between a
pair of industries, we deﬁne undirectional versions of the input and output variables by
Inputij = max{Inputi←j,Inputj←i} and Outputij = max{Outputi→j,Outputj→i}. We
also deﬁne a combined input-output measure: Input-Outputij = max{Inputij,Outputij}.
One signiﬁcant empirical issue is that these patterns of customers and suppliers may
15The large supplier share for Public Building and Related Furniture is due in part to the relatively small
output of the industry. The largest absolute supplier relationship, Plastic Materials and Synthetics (282)
sales to Misc. Plastic Products (308), has a relative output share of 0.32. The data appendix lists the top
ﬁve dependencies for all of the metrics discussed below in both absolute and relative terms.
16Approximately 70 percent are less than 0.0001.
14reﬂect rather than create geographic concentration. If an omitted variable causes two
industries to locate in the same region, they may start selling to each other. To address the
possibility that the vagaries of American geography are responsible for the input-output
measures, we turn to U.K. input-output tables. Keith Maskus, C. Sveikauskas, and Allan
Webster (1994) and Maskus and Webster (1995) use the 1989 Input-Output Balance for
the United Kingdom published by the Central Statistical Oﬃce in 1992. The original table
contained 102 sectors, but Maskus et al. (1994) aggregated those into 80 sectors that
could be matched with U.S. industries. We form UKInputij and UKOutputij measures as
described above using the U.K. input-output data and map these measures to the three-digit
SIC code system. We will use these U.K. measures as instruments for the U.S. input-output
relationships.
4.2 Labor market pooling: People
A second reason to coagglomerate is to take advantage of scale economies associated with
a large labor pool. Marshall himself emphasized the risk-sharing properties of a large
labor market. As individual ﬁrms become more or less productive, workers can shift across
employers thereby maximizing productivity and reducing the variance of worker wages (see
Diamond and Simon, 1990, for evidence and Krugman, 1991a, for a simple model). A
variant on this theory is that agglomerations make it possible for workers to match better
across ﬁrms and industries by providing a wider range of alternatives. Rotemberg and
Saloner (2000) provide yet a third model of labor-market based agglomeration where ﬁrms
cluster together so that workers will come and invest in human capital, knowing that they
do not face ex post appropriation. A ﬁnal model that emphasizes employment sharing is
that new startups locate near older ﬁrms so that they can hire away their workers.
We will not be able to test between these diﬀerent labor-based theories of agglomeration,
but we can test whether industries that employ the same type of workers locate near one
another. All of these labor market pooling hypotheses suggest that agglomeration occurs
because workers are able to move across ﬁrms and industries. These cross-industry moves
will only be likely if the industries use the same type of workers. Therefore we measure
the extent to which diﬀerent industries hire the same occupations. We start with the 1987
15National Industrial-Occupation Employment Matrix (NIOEM) published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). This matrix provides industry-level employment in 277 occupations,
and we use this detail to determine for each industry the share of its employment association
with each occupation, which we denote Shareio for industry i and occupation o. We then
construct a measure of the similarity of employment in industries i and j by deﬁning
LaborCorrelationij to be the correlation of Shareio and Sharejo across occupations.
Table 4 contains summary statistics for this variable. The mean value is 0.470. The
measured correlations of one arise because the industry-occupation matrix reports data
for NIOEM industries, which is a coarser division than three-digit SIC industries. Motor
Vehicles (371) and Motorcycles, Bicycles and Parts (375) have the most similar employment
patterns (0.984) among industries with diﬀerent NIOEM data.
As in the case of input-output matrices, reverse causality is a potential concern. In-
dustries may be hiring the same type of workers because they are located in the same
places and those workers happen to be there. To address this issue, we again turn to U.K.
data where employment patterns should not reﬂect the patterns of American geography.
Since the U.K. does not publish a detailed equivalent of the BLS NIOEM matrix, we con-
structed our own by pooling six years (2001-2006) of the U.K. Labour Force Survey (which
is roughly akin to the U.S. Current Population Survey). We then developed matrices of
the occupation-by-industry distribution of currently employed workers over all six surveys,
which together contained 224,528 employed workers and 42,948 workers in manufacturing.
We mapped the British industry codes into the American system, but kept the occu-
pation measures in their British format. Using this data, we calculated correlations in
occupation employment shares between every two British industries just as we did for the
American industries. This measure will be used as an instrument for the American labor
correlation measure.
4.3 Intellectual or technology spillovers: Ideas
A ﬁnal reason that ﬁrms co-locate is to speed the ﬂow of ideas. Marshall himself emphasized
the advantages that accrue to ﬁrms when workers learn skills quickly from each other
in an industrial cluster. Alternatively, ﬁrms may locate near one another so that the
16ﬁrm’s leaders can learn from each other. Saxenian (1994) argues that this is one cause of
industrial concentration in Silicon Valley. Glaeser and Matthew Kahn (2001) argue that
the urbanization of high human capital industries, like ﬁnance, is evidence for the role that
density plays in speeding the ﬂow of ideas.
The potential for intellectual spillovers is harder to identify than the potential for trade
in goods and for sharing a labor pool. We construct proxies using data from two diﬀerent
sources.
The ﬁrst of these is Frederic Scherer’s (1984) technology ﬂow matrix. Scherer’s matrix
is designed to capture the extent to which R&D activity in one industry ﬂows out to ben-
eﬁt another industry. This technology transfer occurs either through a supplier-customer
relation between these two industries or through the likelihood that patented inventions
obtained in one industry will ﬁnd applications in the other industry. We develop two met-
rics, TechIni←j and TechOuti→j, for these technology ﬂows that mirror Inputi←j and
Outputi→j described above. These dependencies are again directional in nature and are
calculated relative to total technology ﬂows that include non-manufacturing industries and
government R&D. The strongest relative technology ﬂows are associated with Plastic Ma-
terials and Synthetics (282) and its relationships to Misc. Plastics Products (308), Tires
and Inner Tubes (301), and Industrial Organic Chemicals (286).17 Our second data source
is the NBER Patent Database. Using data on patent citations for inventors residing in the
U.S., we develop a measure of the extent to which technologies associated with industry
i cite technologies associated with industry j, and vice versa. The measures PatentIni←j
and PatentOuti→j are normalized by total citations for the industries.18
For our regression analysis we construct undirectional measures of the intellectual
17Similar to the NIOEM industries, Scherer industries map to multiple SIC3s. Our regressions account
for and are robust to this overlap.
18The NBER Patent Data File was originally compiled by Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaﬀe, and Manuel Tra-
jtenberg (2001). It contains records for all patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (USPTO) from January 1975 to December 1999. Each patent record provides information about the
invention (e.g., technology classiﬁcation, citations of prior art) and the inventors submitting the application
(e.g., name, city). The USPTO issues patents by technology categories rather than by industries. Com-
bining the work of Daniel Johnson (1999), Brian Silverman (1999), and Kerr (forthcoming), concordances
are developed between the USPTO classiﬁcation scheme and SIC3 industries (a probabilistic mapping). In
practice, there is little directional diﬀerence between PatentIni←j and PatentOuti→j due to the extensive
number of citations within a single technology ﬁeld, in which case the probabilistic citing and cited industry
distributions are the same.
17spillovers across an industry pair, Techij and Patentij, in a manner analogous to our
construction of Input-Outputij.
Many authors have used patent citations to assess intellectual spillovers, but they are
obviously only an imperfect measure of intellectual spillovers.19 As Michael Porter (1991)
emphasizes, much knowledge sharing occurs between consumers and suppliers and this
may be captured more by input-output relationships than by these citations. Idea sharing
through the exchange of workers may be better captured by our occupational employment
correlation than through patent-based metrics. As such, we see our patent citation measure
as a proxy for the importance of exchanging technology rather than as a proxy for all forms
of intellectual spillovers.
Again there is the concern of endogeneity of intellectual exchanges, as industries may
cite each other’s patents because of locational proximity. To address this issue, we use the
U.K. patents in the NBER patent database to form a citations matrix based entirely on
non-U.S. patents. We use the patent ﬂow numbers across U.K. industries as an instrument
for the U.S. technology ﬂows.
5 Empirical Results
We now present our main empirical results. As described above, we examine the relation-
ships between the coagglomeration metrics calculated from the Census Bureau data and
various inter-industry dependency metrics. We ﬁrst examine direct partial correlations ev-
ident in the U.S. data, and then we turn to instrumental variable regressions using U.K.
data to conﬁrm a causal interpretation. We ﬁnd evidence to support all three agglomera-
tion theories, and our results most strongly emphasize the importance of input-output and
labor pooling explanations.
The core empirical speciﬁcation is
Coaggij = α + βLLaborCorrelationij + βIOInputOutputij + βTTechij + εij,
where Coaggij is our measure of the pairwise coagglomeration between industries i and j
19See Zvi Griliches (1990), Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson (1993), and Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg,
and Michael Fogarty (2000).
18in 1987. The sample contains 7381 industry pair observations: all distinct pairs from a
sample of 122 industries.20
We perform these analyses with four diﬀerent versions of the dependent variable: we cal-
culate the coagglomeration measures using state-, PMSA-, and county-level total industry-
employment data, and also with the state-level data on employment in startups.
To make it easier to assess the magnitude of each variable’s importance, we normalize
both the left- and right-hand side variables in all of our regressions so that they have
standard deviation one.
5.1 Correlations in univariate regressions
Before proceeding to the actual regressions, Table 5 presents results from univariate regres-
sions where coagglomeration is regressed on four diﬀerent measures of the diﬀerent theory:
our measure of labor pool similarity (LaborCorrelation), our combined input-output mea-
sure (Input-Output), and the measures of technology ﬂows from the Scherer matrix (Tech)
and from patent citations (Patent). Each cell of the table reports a coeﬃcient from a sep-
arate univariate regression. Each row represents a diﬀerent explanatory variable. Each
column corresponds to a diﬀerent measure of coagglomeration. The ﬁrst column uses the
state-level measures. The second column uses the PMSA-level measures. The third column
uses the county-level measures, and the fourth column uses the startup coagglomeration
measure.
Column (1) shows that the basic relationships between the ﬁrst three measures and state
total employment coagglomeration are quite similar. A one standard deviation increase in
the labor correlation measure is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in the
state-level coagglomeration measure. A one standard deviation increase in the input-output
measure is association with a 0.205 standard deviation increase in the coagglomeration
measure. The Scherer technology ﬂow variable yields a 0.18 coeﬃcient. The patent citation
variable yields a somewhat lower coeﬃcient of 0.08.
20The sample omits twelve industries for which we could measure coagglomeration: all Apparel industries
(230s), a portion of Printing and Publishing (277-279), and Secondary Non-Ferrous Metals (334). Some
exclusions are due to an inability to construct appropriate Marshallian explanatory measures and some are
due to outlier concerns.
19At the PMSA and county levels, the gap between the magnitudes of the eﬀects widens.
The coeﬃcient on labor correlation is 0.106 and 0.082 in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
The coeﬃcient on input-output in the same two columns is 0.167 and 0.130. The coeﬃcient
on the Scherer technology ﬂows is 0.148 and 0.107. Coagglomeration relationships are
weaker at the metropolitan level, which can be explained if ﬁrms are drawn to counties
because of other ﬁrms in neighboring counties.
The fourth column examines the coagglomeration of startup activity in industry pairs.
The coeﬃcients in these regressions are lower than in the previous regression. Again, input-
output relationships seem to be the most important.
5.2 OLS regression results
Table 6 presents OLS coeﬃcient estimates for our core empirical speciﬁcation. Each column
reports coeﬃcients from a single regression with a pairwise coagglomeration (measured
using state-level data) as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 0.146 for labor
correlation, 0.149 for the input-output measure, and 0.112 for the Scherer technology ﬂows.
In the second column, we break input-output eﬀects into an input measure and an
output measure. Both eﬀects are quite signiﬁcant and large.
The third column excludes all industry pairs involving two industries belonging to the
same two-digit SIC industry. There are both conceptual and methodological reasons for
this exclusion. Conceptually, we might think that industries within the same two-digit SIC
code are more likely to be driven to coagglomerate because of omitted geographic factors
that drive the location patterns of such similar industries. Methodologically, some of our
measures, like the technology ﬂow measure, have variation that straddles the two-digit and
three-digit levels. The coeﬃcient estimates in this regression are slightly lower, but similar
in magnitude to the base regression in the ﬁrst column.
The regressions in the fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth columns provide another robustness check.
For these regressions we have redeﬁned the input-output and technology ﬂow variables to
be means (rather than maximums) of the directional variables on which they are based.
In these speciﬁcations, input-output measures are generally more important, and labor
correlation is somewhat less important.
20Appendix Table 2 presents regressions similar to the base regression in the ﬁrst column
of Table 6, but with the three alternative coagglomeration measures as the dependent
variables. These substitutions yield similar results.
Two general conclusions emerge from these regressions. First, all three of Marshall’s
(1920) theories regarding agglomeration ﬁnd support in the coagglomeration patterns. Sec-
ond, the input-output relationship appears to be the most important contributor. The
labor pooling hypothesis ﬁnds the second most support.
5.3 IV regression results
In this section we present our core results using the U.K. instruments. Appendix Table 3
presents the ﬁrst-stage regression estimates. The t-statistics are over 15 for the relevant
instruments.
Table 7 presents estimates from sixteen regressions. The regressions reported in Panel
A include the input-output and labor correlation measures of industry relatedness. The
odd regressions (1), (3), (5), and (7) are OLS results. One slight diﬀerence from Table 6
is that we exclude all industry-pairs involving two ﬁrms in the same two-digit industry.21
The even regressions (2), (4), (6), and (8) are the IV results. We present results for state-,
PMSA-, and county-level coagglomeration and for the coagglomeration of startups.
Comparing regressions (1) and (2) in Panel A shows that the IV speciﬁcations cause
the coeﬃcients on labor correlation and the input-output measures to rise modestly. Both
coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant.
The regressions in Panel B also include the Scherer measure of technology ﬂows (with
U.K. patent ﬂows as the instrument in the IV speciﬁcations). The ﬁrst regression is Panel
B is an exact duplicate of regression (3) in Table 6, repeated to permit easy comparison
between the OLS and IV results. The diﬀerences between regressions (1) and (2) are modest
in magnitude, but the coeﬃcients on input-output and technology ﬂows become statistically
insigniﬁcant. The labor correlation remains robust.
21We made this change for two reasons. First, the U.K. input-output tables have a relevant limitation. We
explicitly exclude intra-industry ﬂows at the SIC3 level from the U.S. input-output tables. In several cases,
we are required to map the same U.K. industry to multiple SIC3 industries within an SIC2. In these cases,
we are not able to distinguish ﬂows across these SIC3 industries from intra-industry ﬂows. In addition, some
of the instruments have limited variation within two-digit industries.
21The regressions in columns (3) and (4) use PMSA-level coagglomeration as the depen-
dent variable. In both panels there is a reversal in the importance-ranking of the labor
correlation and input-output measures when we move from the OLS to the IV speciﬁca-
tions. In the OLS estimates, input-output relationships look dramatically more important
than labor correlation. In the IV speciﬁcation, labor correlation is both larger in magnitude
and more statistically signiﬁcant.
At the county level in Panel A, input-output measures are more important and signiﬁ-
cant in both the OLS and IV regressions. In Panel B, the IV measures are all statistically
insigniﬁcant.
Finally, regressions (7) and (8) examine the coagglomeration of new ﬁrm births in
industry pairs. In both panels the use of instrumental variables makes both the input-
output and labor correlation measures much more important. In each case, these the
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant in the IV speciﬁcations.
We interpret Table 7 as indicating that at least the labor correlation and input-output
relationships with coagglomeration are robust to our IV approach. The IV speciﬁcation
generally causes coeﬃcients to rise, but the increase is generally statistically insigniﬁcant.
When we include the technology ﬂows measure, measurement becomes more diﬃcult. Our
instrument for technology ﬂows is highly correlated with the input-output measure, so it
becomes diﬃcult to identify separately input-output eﬀects and technology ﬂow eﬀects.
6 Conclusion
Our ﬁrst conclusion from our analysis of coagglomeration patterns is that there is support
for the importance of all three theories of agglomeration. In the OLS speciﬁcations, all
variables have statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful eﬀects. The IV results
continue to show a robust eﬀect for labor correlation. The input-output coeﬃcients are
similar in magnitude or rise in size, but are less signiﬁcant when we also include technology
ﬂows. The technology ﬂows measures are less robust when we use our IV measures.
Which of the theories seems to be more important? Our basic conclusion is that this
work suggests all three are roughly equal in magnitude. A one standard deviation growth
in labor correlation or input-output increases coagglomeration by around one seventh of a
22standard deviation. In some speciﬁcations, the technology ﬂows eﬀect is somewhat weaker,
but in others it is also close in magnitude.
It is unclear how these results would generalize to non-manufacturing industries. Ser-
vices are more costly to transport since they involve face-to-face interaction and therefore
we might think that input-output relationships are particularly important in that sector
(Jed Kolko, 1997). Ideas may be more important in more innovative sectors, so idea ﬂows
might be more important elsewhere. But at least in manufacturing, transport costs for
goods, people, and ideas all still seem to matter, and all three of Marshall’s theories ﬁnd
vindication in the data.
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The ﬁnal formula results from noting that 2w1w2 = 1 −
P2
i=1 w2
i when w1 + w2 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (a) of the theorem follows immediately from backward
induction. The ﬁnal plant to move must choose in this way. Given that the ﬁnal plant will
locate in this way, the next-to-last plant maximizes its payoﬀ by choosing the location that
maximizes log(xm) + km if it has no spillover with a previously located plant, because it
will receive full spillover beneﬁts from the ﬁnal plant (if such spillovers exist) regardless of
its location choice. The qualiﬁcation “essentially unique” in the proposition reﬂects that
the maximizing choice is not unique when the maximizer of log(xm) + km is not unique.
This occurs with probability zero.
Part (b) states that we can choose a distribution over partitions that satisﬁes
Prob{k0 ∈ ω(k)} =
(
γs
i if plants k and k0 both belong to industry i
γs
0 if plants k and k0 belong to diﬀerent industries,
if either of two hypotheses holds.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that 0 ≤ γs
0 ≤ γs
1,γs
2. In this case, a four-point distribution
suﬃces. Let ω0 be the fully disjoint partition: ω0(k) = {k} for all k. Let ωi be the partition
in which all plants in industry i are in a single cluster with the remaining plants disjoint:
ωi(k) = Ki if k ∈ Ki and ωi(k) = {k} otherwise. Let ω12 be the partition with all plants
in a single cluster: ω12(k) = K1 ∪ K2 for all k. The distribution that places probability
γs
0 on ω12, probability γs
i − γs
0 on ωi, and the remaining probability on ω0 has the desired
property.
27The second hypothesis is that 0 ≤ γs
1,γs
2 and 0 ≤ γ0 ≤ min(1/N1,1/N2). In this case, it
is simplest to describe the construction of a distribution on the set of partitions on K1∪K2
as a two-step process. Let p1 be a probability distribution over partitions of K1 that satisﬁes
p1({ω|k0 ∈ ω(k)}) = γs
1 for all k,k0 ∈ K1. This can be done easily by putting probability γs
1
on the partition with all plants in a single cluster and the remaining probability on a disjoint
partition, and can also be done in many other ways if γs
1 is not too large. Similarly, let p2 be a
distribution over partitions of K2 that satisﬁes p2({ω|k0 ∈ ω(k)}) = γs
2 for all k,k0 ∈ K2. To
choose a partition of K1∪K2, ﬁrst draw partitions ω1 of K1 and ω2 of K2 according to p1 and
p2. Let Ci be the set of clusters in partition i: Ci = {S ⊂ Ki|ω1(k) = S for some k ∈ K1}.
Assuming WLOG that |C1| < |C2|, let f be a one-to-one function from C1 to C2 chosen
uniformly from the set of all such functions. Then, deﬁne a partition ω on K1∪K2 by setting
ω(k) = ω1(k) with probability 1−|C2|γ0 and ω(k) = ω1(k)∪f(ω1(k)) with probability |C2|γ0
for k ∈ K1, and deﬁning ω(k) = ω2(k) if k ∈ K2 and k has not previously been deﬁned
as belonging to some ω(k) with k ∈ K1. (The randomization in this deﬁnition is perfectly
correlated across k and k0 if k0 ∈ ω1(k) and can have any correlation if k and k0 are not in
the same cluster.) It is straightforward that a partition created this way has the desired
property.
Part (c) is a corollary of Proposition 0. Let ukm be an indicator for plant k locating in
area m. A standard property of the logit model is that Prob{ukm = 1} = xm/
P
m0 xm0 =




xm if k0 ∈ ω(k)
x2
m otherwise.
The unconditional expectation is E(ukmuk0m) = x2









m + Prob{k0 ∈ ω(k)}(xm − x2
m) − x2
m p
xm(1 − xm)xm(1 − xm)
= Prob{k0 ∈ ω(k)}
Hence, the hypothesis of Proposition 0 is satisﬁed whenever the condition on the distribution
over partitions in part (b) of Proposition 2 holds.














2 2cmxm degrees of freedom, respectively,
for some constants cm ∈ [0,1]. The additive property of χ2 random variables implies that





2xm degrees of freedom. Note that δmi and δm0i
are independent if m 6= m0. A standard result on Chi-square distributions implies that
δmi/
PM











22See Chapter 25 of Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1995).
28A Beta distribution with parameters θ1 and θ2 has expectation θ1/(θ1 + θ2) and variance
θ1θ2









































i xm(1 − xm).
This shows that the distributions have two of the three desired properties given in part (a)
of the Proposition.








0 xm(1 − xm)
holds for some choice of cm ∈ [0,1]. The covariance is a continuous function of cm. When
cm = 0, the covariance is zero. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem we can complete





1 xm(1 − xm) when cm = 1.





























Y0 + Y 0
0 + Y1 + Y2

,
where Y0 = ηm, Y 0
0 =
P
m06=m ηm0, Y1 = ξm2, and Y2 =
P
m06=m ξm02. Note that Y0, Y 0
0, Y1
and Y2 are mutually independent Chi-square random variables. By rewriting the last term
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0 are independent.23 This immediately implies that the second covariance in the line















Y0 + Y 0
0
Y0 + Y 0
0
Y0 + Y 0










Y0 + Y 0
0
Y0 + Y 0
0 + Y1 + Y2

.
23See Chapter 17 of Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994).
29Plugging in the appropriate degrees of freedom into the formulas for the mean and variance
of Beta-distributed random variables we ﬁnd that this is equal to
γna
















301972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
EG Agglomeration Index γ Mean 0.0398 0.0399 0.0392 0.0368 0.0351 0.0342
EG Coagglomeration Index γc Mean 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
EG Coagglomeration Index γc SD 0.0150 0.0139 0.0140 0.0133 0.0129 0.0124
EG Agglomeration Index γ Mean 0.0298 0.0292 0.0286 0.0285 0.0271 0.0299
EG Coagglomeration Index γc Mean 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
EG Coagglomeration Index γc SD 0.0086 0.0075 0.0069 0.0061 0.0054 0.0060
EG Agglomeration Index γ Mean 0.0290 0.0022 0.0121 0.0107 0.0158 0.0285
EG Coagglomeration Index γc Mean 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
EG Coagglomeration Index γc SD 0.0193 0.0172 0.0177 0.0150 0.0187 0.0181
Table 1:  Levels of Geographic Agglomeration and Coagglomeration 1972-1997
C. State-Level Employment in Firm Births
A. State-Level Total Employment
Notes:  Measures of industrial agglomeration and coagglomeration calculated from the Census of Manufacturers.  
Estimates include all manufacturing SIC3 industries, except those listed in the text, for 134 observations per year.
B. PMSA-Level Total Employment1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
1977 0.953
1982 0.891 0.944
1987 0.841 0.889 0.936
1992 0.791 0.840 0.895 0.959
1997 0.740 0.789 0.832 0.890 0.941
Notes: See Table 1.  EG Coagglomeration Index measured through state total 
employments for each industry.
Table 2: Correlation of EG Coagglomeration IndexRank Industry 1 Industry 2 Coaggl.
1 Broadwoven Mills, Cotton (221) Yarn and Thread Mills (228) 0.207
2 Knitting Mills (225) Yarn and Thread Mills (228) 0.187
3 Broadwoven Mills, Fiber (222) Textile Finishing (226) 0.178
4 Broadwoven Mills, Cotton (221) Broadwoven Mills, Fiber (222) 0.171
5 Broadwoven Mills, Fiber (222) Yarn and Thread Mills (228) 0.164
6 Handbags (317) Photographic Equipment (386) 0.155
7 Broadwoven Mills, Wool (223) Carpets and Rugs (227) 0.149
8 Carpets and Rugs (227) Yarn and Thread Mills (228) 0.142
9 Photographic Equipment (386) Jewelry, Silverware, Plated Ware (391) 0.139
10 Textile Finishing (226) Yarn and Thread Mills (228) 0.138
11 Broadwoven Mills, Cotton (221) Textile Finishing (226) 0.137
12 Broadwoven Mills, Cotton (221) Carpets and Rugs (227) 0.137
13 Broadwoven Mills, Cotton (221) Knitting Mills (225) 0.136
14 Carpets and Rugs (227) Pulp Mills (261) 0.110
15 Jewelry, Silverware, Plated Ware (391) Costume Jewelry and Notions (396) 0.107
Notes: See Table 1.  EG Coagglomeration Index measured through state total employments for each industry.
Table 3: Highest 1987 Pairwise CoagglomerationsMean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
State Total Empl. Pairwise Coaggl. 0.000 0.013 -0.065 0.207
PMSA Total Empl. Pairwise Coaggl. 0.000 0.006 -0.025 0.119
County Total Empl. Pairwise Coaggl. 0.000 0.003 -0.018 0.080
State Birth Empl. Pairwise Coaggl. 0.000 0.015 -0.082 0.259
Labor Correlation 0.470 0.226 -0.046 1.000
Input-Output Maximum 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.823
Input-Output Mean 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.240
Input Maximum 0.005 0.019 0.000 0.392
Input Mean 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.196
Output Maximum 0.005 0.026 0.000 0.823
Output Mean 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.411
Scherer R&D Tech Maximum 0.005 0.026 0.000 0.625
Scherer R&D Tech Mean 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.263
Patent Citation Tech Maximum 0.015 0.025 0.000 0.400
Patent Citation Tech Mean 0.007 0.014 0.000 0.203
Notes:  Descriptive statistics for 1987.  All pairwise combinations of manufacturing SIC3 industries are included, 
except those listed in the text, for 7381 observations.  Coagglomeration measures are calculated from the 1987 
Census of Manufacturers.  Labor Correlation indices are calculated from the BLS National Industry-Occupation 
Employment Matrix for 1987.  Input-Output relationships are calculated from the BEA Benchmark Input-Output 
Matrix for 1987.  Technology Flows are calculated from the Scherer (1984) R&D tables for the 1970s and from 
the NBER Patent Citation Database for 1975-1997.  See the data appendix for further details.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration Regressions
A. Pairwise Coagglomeration Measures
B. Pairwise Labor Similarities Index
C. Pairwise Input-Output Relationship Indices
D. Pairwise Technology Relationship IndicesEach row and 
column reports a State Total PMSA Total County Total State Firm Birth
separate estimation Employment Employment Employment Employment
with single regressor Coagglomeration Coagglomeration Coagglomeration Coagglomeration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Correlation 0.180 0.106 0.082 0.077 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Input-Output 0.205 0.167 0.130 0.112 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Technology  Flows 0.180 0.148 0.107 0.089 
Scherer R&D (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Technology  Flows 0.081 0.100 0.085 0.068 
Patent Citations (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Table 5: OLS Univariate Specifications for 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration
Notes:  Each cell reports a separate regression of pairwise EG Coagglomeration Index on a determinant of 
industrial co-location.  Coagglomeration measures are calculated from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers using 
the employments listed in the column headers.  All pairwise combinations of manufacturing SIC3 industries are 
included, except those listed in the text, for 7381 observations.  Labor Correlation indices are calculated from 
the BLS National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix for 1987.  Input-Output relationships are calculated 
from the BEA Benchmark Input-Output Matrix for 1987.  Technology Flows are calculated from the Scherer 
(1984) R&D tables for the 1970s and from the NBER Patent Citation Database for 1975-1997.  Maximum 
values for the pairwise combination are employed.  All variables are transformed to (mean 0, standard 
deviation 1) for interpretation.  Regressions are unweighted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable is EG Coagglomeration IndexDependent variable
is EG Coaggl. Index Base Separate Exclude Base Separate Exclude
calculated with  Estimation Input & Pairs in Estimation Input & Pairs in
state total emp. Output Same SIC2 Output Same SIC2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labor Correlation 0.146 0.142 0.110  0.135 0.134 0.108 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Input-Output 0.149 0.108  0.185 0.117 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Input 0.109 0.116 
(0.014) (0.014)
Output 0.095 0.098 
(0.013) (0.013)
Technology  Flows 0.112 0.096 0.050  0.125 0.121 0.032 
Scherer R&D (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 7381 7381 7000 7381 7381 7000
Table 6: OLS Multivariate Specifications for 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration
Notes:  See Table 5.  Regression of pairwise EG Coagglomeration Index on determinants of industrial co-location.  
Coagglomeration measures are calculated from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers using state total employments for each industry.  
Columns 3 and 6 exclude SIC3 pairwise combinations within the same SIC2.  Appendix Table 2 repeats Column 1 with alternative 
coagglomeration metrics.
Pairwise Maximum Regressions Pairwise Mean RegressionsState State PMSA PMSA County County State State
Total Empl. Total Empl. Total Empl. Total Empl. Total Empl. Total Empl. Birth Empl. Birth Empl.
Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl. Coaggl.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Correlation 0.108 0.140  0.033 0.151  0.029 0.047  0.042 0.187 
(0.012) (0.056) (0.012) (0.057) (0.012) (0.056) (0.012) (0.056)
Input-Output 0.121 0.149  0.096 0.078  0.075 0.103  0.051 0.152 
(0.012) (0.045) (0.012) (0.045) (0.012) (0.045) (0.012) (0.043)
Labor Correlation 0.110 0.120  0.035 0.136  0.030 0.028  0.042 0.254 
(0.012) (0.059) (0.012) (0.060) (0.012) (0.060) (0.012) (0.066)
Input-Output 0.108 0.095  0.085 0.039  0.068 0.051  0.047 0.341 
(0.012) (0.121) (0.012) (0.123) (0.012) (0.123) (0.012) (0.136)
Technology  Flows 0.050 0.104  0.041 0.076  0.026 0.099  0.015 -0.359
Scherer R&D (0.012) (0.181) (0.012) (0.183) (0.012) (0.183) (0.012) (0.204)
Table 7: OLS and IV Multivariate Specifications for 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration
Notes:  See Tables 5 and 6.  OLS and IV Regression of pairwise EG Coagglomeration Index on determinants of industrial co-location.  Appendix Table 3 documents the 
first-stage coefficients.
Dependent Variable is EG Coagglomeration Index
A. OLS and IV Multivariate Specifications with Labor and Input-Output Only
B. OLS and IV Multivariate Specifications with Scherer Technology Metric20 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
20 0.002
22 -0.003 0.102
23 0.000 0.021 0.012
24 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.013
25 -0.001 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.000
26 0.001 0.012 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.005
27 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.004
28 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.007
29 0.004 -0.018 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.013
30 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
31 0.000 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.019
32 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.003
33 -0.001 -0.012 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.010
34 -0.001 -0.014 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.004
35 0.000 -0.011 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001
36 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
37 -0.001 -0.017 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
38 -0.002 -0.010 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.008
39 -0.001 -0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.006 0.012 0.014
App. Table 1: Inter-Industry 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration Averages
Notes:  Table entries are the weighted-average pairwise SIC3 coagglomerations within the pairwise SIC2 cell.  EG Coagglomeration Index measured through state total employments 
for each industry.State Total PMSA Total County Total State Firm Birth
Employment Employment Employment Employment
Coagglomeration Coagglomeration Coagglomeration Coagglomeration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Correlation 0.146 0.078 0.060 0.060 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Input-Output 0.149 0.125 0.101 0.086 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Technology  Flows 0.112 0.098 0.067 0.054 
Scherer R&D (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
App. Table 2: OLS Multivariate Specifications for 1987 Pairwise Coagglomeration
Notes:  See Table 6.  Column 1 repeats the first column of Table 6 with coagglomeration measured through 
state total employments for each industry.  Columns 2-4 substitute alternative metrics of coagglomeration.
Dependent Variable is EG Coagglomeration IndexDependent variable
is the explanatory 
regressor listed in  Labor Input- Technology Labor Input- Labor Input- Technology
the column header Correlation Output Scherer Correlation Output Correlation Output Scherer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UK Labor IV 0.278  0.262  0.095  0.247  0.041 0.048
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
UK Input-Output 0.345  0.070  0.323 0.064 0.300  0.159 
IV (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
UK Technology  0.237  0.054 0.202 0.195 
Flows IV (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
with Technology
Multivariate First-Stages
App. Table 3: Univariate and Multivariate First-Stage Specifications for UK IV of Determinants of Co-Locations
Notes:  First-stage regressions of U.S. pairwise determinants of industrial co-location on similarly constructed U.K. instruments.  All pairwise 
combinations of manufacturing SIC3 industries are included, except those listed in the text, for 7000 observations.  The decline in observations 
from Table 5 is due to the exclusion of pairwise combinations within the same SIC2.  Variable constructions are described in the data appendix.  
Maximum values for the pairwise combination are employed.  All variables are transformed to (mean 0, standard deviation 1) for interpretation.  
Regressions are unweighted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Univariate First-Stage Specifications without Technology
Multivariate First-Stages